The procedural rules of international courts are key to the ability of such courts to adjudicate questions of shared responsibility. These procedural rules, as well as the practice of international courts, vary widely and have not yet been subject of systematic study. To provide a basis for studying the degree in which international courts can effectively adjudicate claims against multiple responsible actors, this contribution will provide an analytical framework. This 2 that are relevant to judicial handling of questions of shared responsibility; an identification of procedural rules that are specific to questions of shared responsibility, and of those procedural rules that are more generally typical for multilateral dispute settlement; and an identification of factors that account for differences between international courts in terms of their ability to handle questions of shared responsibility.
Judge Shahabuddeen noted, in the increasingly complex character of international relations 'legal disputes between States are rarely purely bilateral'. 12 Though questions of responsibility are not typically brought in international courts (but rather are settled in negotiations), there is a not insignificant body of case law on questions of international responsibility involving multiple responsible parties, in particular in the ICJ 13 and the ECtHR.
14 It has been suggested that the present system of international dispute settlement is not well designed to deal with multilateral disputes. 15 This proposition would have relevance for adjudication of questions of shared responsibility, which after all are a particular type of a multilateral dispute. For instance, given that international dispute settlement mechanisms are based on the consent of states, the mere fact that one responsible state has not consented to the judicial process may suffice to exclude a case of shared responsibility from judicial scrutiny.
Likewise, if one of the wrongdoing actors is an international organisation other than the European Union (EU) or the Seabed Authority, questions of shared responsibility may be deemed inadmissible before the ICJ, the WTO DSU, the LOSC DSP and the ECtHR, which do not have jurisdiction over (other) international organisations. 12 
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) (Preliminary Objections) [1992] ICJ Rep 240, Separate
Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen 298. However, care should be taken in making generalised statement on the ability or inability of international courts to handle questions of shared responsibility. There is very little scholarship available that has examined the procedural rules of international courts from this particular perspective. 16 Moreover, given the differences between international courts, it is unlikely that the situation will be the same for all international courts and tribunals. For instance, while the jurisdictional barriers in the ICJ may make litigation against multiple responsible states sometimes difficult, arbitral rules are flexible and may precisely be used to allow such complex types of adjudication. The degree in which there indeed are differences in the ability of individual courts has not been subjected to systematic study.
It is the aim of the present collection of articles to contribute to our understanding of how international courts address questions of shared responsibility that arise in international litigation.
The collection will present a comprehensive assessment of the degree in which the five selected courts are able to adjudicate claims against multiple responsible actors, and will assess the main facilitating or limiting factors.
To frame the scope of this collection of papers and to identify the issues that will be explored in the individual contributions, in this introductory contribution I will provide an analytical framework for examining international adjudication of questions of shared responsibility. This analytical framework will guide, to the extent relevant, the individual contributions on, respectively, the ICJ, arbitral tribunals, adjudication under the WTO DSU, the dispute settlement procedures under the LOSC, and the ECtHR. The formulation of the framework also draws on information provided in the individual articles, and as such serves to identify common elements and differences.
The analytical framework consists of four elements:
1) A definition of 'shared responsibility' and 'procedural rules of international adjudication'.
This definition allows us to determine what rules and practices are relevant to, and subject of the inquiry (section 2).
2) A typology of procedural rules that are relevant to judicial handling of questions of shared responsibility. This typology allows us to assess a particular court in terms of its ability to adjudicate questions of shared responsibility (section 3).
3) An identification of procedural rules (part of the typology) that are specific to questions of shared responsibility, and of those procedural rules (part of the typology) that are more generally typical for multilateral dispute settlement. This element of the analytical framework allows us to identify, whether a particular procedural rule that facilitates or limits the possibility of a court to adjudicate a question of shared responsibility is intrinsically related to shared responsibility, or whether it similarly arises in relation to other aspects of multilateral dispute settlement (section 4).
4)
A tentative identification of factors that account for differences between international courts in terms of their ability to handle questions of shared responsibility (section 5).
Key Definitions
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The present inquiry necessitates as a preliminary matter a conceptual clarification of the two concepts on which this collection of articles is based: 'shared responsibility' (A) and 'procedural rules of international adjudication' (B).
A. Shared Responsibility
For purposes of this collection of articles, I define the concept of 'shared responsibility' by three The third defining feature of shared responsibility is that the responsibility of two or more actors for their contribution to a harmful outcome is distributed to them separately, rather than resting on them collectively. 20 Thus, in the Nauru case, even though the alleged wrong originated from conduct of an organ common to Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the responsibility was not allocated to these three states collectively, but to Australia and potentially to the two other states individually. 21 Conversely, responsibility of the European Union for a trade measure that falls under its exclusive competences, 22 is not a shared responsibility, since it the EU is a single, collective actor.
There is a wide variety of situations that fall under this definition of shared responsibility. The key point thus is that procedural questions may differ, depending on the nature of shared responsibility at issue. Where relevant, distinctions between various types of shared responsibility will be drawn in the individual articles.
B. Procedural Rules
This collection of articles focusses primarily on the procedural law of international courts that determines how such courts handle questions of shared responsibility, rather than on questions, or principles of shared responsibility itself. Examples of such procedural rules are rules on joinder, evidence and fact-finding. Questions of the contents of the law of shared responsibility (e.g. whether or not international law allows for multiple attribution), 28 are not subject of analysis. However, the distinction is not always clear-cut, and a few preliminary comments are in
order to frame what is, and what is not, subject of analysis in the present collection of articles. 27 See for the last example: Bartels (n 5) __.
28 See e.g. Before examining the specific relation between procedural law and the law of (shared) responsibility, I will first identify the relation between procedural law and substantive law generally. A useful starting point for this purpose is provided by Salmond:
The law of procedure may be defined as that branch of the law which governs the process of litigation… All the residue is substantive law, and relates not to the process of litigation, but to its purposes and subjectmatter… Procedural law is concerned with affairs inside the courts of justice; substantive law deals with matters in the world outside.
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The question is whether this distinction holds in international law. Rosenne appears to answer this question in the negative, observing that 'international law does not recognize a sharp distinction between substantive and adjectival law'. 30 While there is more than a grain of validity in this observation, it would complicate things if we were to throw out the distinction altogether.
In many cases the dividing lines between procedural and substantive law are clear and relevant.
All international courts have a set of rules that they label as 'procedural' and which govern the process of adjudication -not, at least not directly, the substance of the rights at issue.
The distinction between procedure and substance is not sharp, however: ' [ The broader point here is that it can be expected that the development of procedural law to some extent follows the development of substantive law of responsibility, and vice versa. In one of the rare, albeit extremely short, discussions of the relation between international substantive and procedural law, Jenks noted that it is to be expected that procedural law follows substantive law, and vice versa:
In every legal system law and procedure constantly react upon each other. Changes in the substantive law call for new procedures and remedies; new procedures and remedies make possible changes in the substantive law. So it is in international law; if we wish so to develop the law as to respond to the challenge of our times, our procedures and remedies must be sufficiently varied and flexible for the purpose. Putting the procedural rules in the context of such substantive principles will provide a richer analysis and aid understanding of the function of the procedural rules.
Procedural Rules Relevant to Shared Responsibility
The procedural rules that are relevant to shared responsibility, and that therefore will be considered in the articles on the individual international courts, can be grouped into three categories. The first category consists of rules that determine whether it is possible to bring all responsible parties before the court (A). The second category consists of rules that determine how a court handles proceedings in a situation where multiple responsible parties are before the court (B). The third category consists of rules that govern how a court deals with absent (responsible) parties (C).
A. How to Bring All Parties Before a Court
Perhaps the most fundamental procedural question pertaining to shared responsibility is whether a court can exercise jurisdiction over all responsible parties. 49 This question can be differentiated in four more specific questions. A first question is whether the court is able to exercise jurisdiction over all types of actors that are co-responsible for a particular harm. Here considerable differences exist between international courts. In the ICJ only states can be parties in proceedings. 50 If a (co-)responsible party is an organisation, a company or private individual, these cannot be brought before the Court. In contrast, the dispute settlement procedures of the ITLOS are also open to 'entities other than States Parties'. 51 The WTO dispute settlement procedure can hear claims against states and the EU. 52 The ECtHR at present can only hear claims against states, but in the future will be able to decide claims against the EU. For arbitral tribunals, everything depends on the terms of the arbitration agreement, and there is no a priori limitation to the actors that can be brought before such tribunals.
Second, within the category of actors that in principle can be brought before an international court, only those actors can appear as defendants that have consented to the jurisdiction of the court, through a bilateral or multilateral treaty or otherwise. 53 Here crucial and continue the examination of a dispute (as opposed to the actual examination of the dispute on the merits) is regarded as much a matter of jurisdiction as is the question whether a tribunal may interpret a judgment once given or review it. The dissimilar question whether a tribunal may exercise judicial authority over a third party who seeks to intervene and whether a tribunal may only issue a declaration of rights and obligation rather than go further have distinctions exist between situations where states and/or international organisations have given their consent before a questions of shared responsibility arises (this will apply in any case to the ECtHR and the WTO dispute settlement procedure, potentially also for the other international courts), on the one hand, and situations where no such a priori consent has been given. In the latter case, it is more likely that one or a few, but not all co-responsible parties can be brought before the court.
Third, the powers of courts for determining responsibility of multiple responsible parties depend on the applicable law. 54 Given that all international courts can only apply a certain set of rules, the potential responsibility of an actor under another set of rules is irrelevant for that particular court. For instance, the LOSC DSP will in principle only be able to adjudicate claims under the Law of the Sea Convention. If one of the potentially co-responsible parties has, by its contribution to the single harmful outcome, acted in contravention of a human rights treaty, that might 'objectively' make it co-responsible, but the LOSC DSP will not be able to adjudicate claims on that basis.
Fourth, the question whether all responsible parties may be brought before an international court may depend on the standing of a state, or other actor, to present a claim against two or more responsible actors, over which the court in principle has jurisdiction. In the ICJ, if a state has no legal interest in the subject matter of his claim (a right that is potentially 54 I thank Lorand Bartels for pointing out this particular point.
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violated by a particular party), the state lacks standing and the court will not deal with the substantive questions of that particular claim. These four questions will guide individual analyses of international courts to assess whether a court can exercise jurisdiction in relation to all responsible parties. It is to be added that the role of actors whose responsibility cannot be determined by an international court on any of the above grounds, can still be relevant in terms of its causal contribution to a particular harmful outcome, and as such may be relevant to questions of reparation. 55 This may be different in other courts, such as the WTO, see EC -Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Banana´s III) WT/DS27/AB/R AB-1997-3 (rejecting a requirement of legal standing).
56 Paparinskis (n 3) __.
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B. How to Handle Multiple Party Proceedings
A second set of questions relates to how an international court can handle the involvement of multiple defendants in respect to which it exercises jurisdiction. Two scenarios present themselves. On the one hand, cases against multiple defendants can be adjudicated in separate proceedings. On the other hand, cases can be litigated in one proceeding against multiple defendants. Either the plaintiff can list all responsible parties as defendants in one case, 58 or if that is not done, a court may join the proceedings into one case.
The choice between these two options depends of course first and foremost on the question whether an international court has the power to join cases. Except for arbitration, 59 few barriers exist. For instance, both the ECtHR, 60 and the ICJ have the power to join proceedings. 61 The more difficult question is on what grounds they should decide. 62 The prime question is whether in a case of shared responsibility the connection between the responsible parties is such that joinder is justified -either pragmatically (as it may prevent duplicative (and costly) proceedings), or more principally given the connection between the cases. The interrelationship between wrongfulness, responsibility and reparation may be better dealt with in one proceeding.
Whether this is the case may depend on the nature of shared responsibility. In a case of cumulative, unrelated shared responsibility, separate proceedings can be expected (even though in such a case reasons of judicial efficiency may justify joinder). But in the case of cooperative responsibility, and certainly in case there is a single wrongful act, there is much reason to consolidate separate cases in one procedure.
However, the interest that may be served by joinder in the sense of capturing the shared nature of the responsibility may have to be balanced against the interests of the defendants, who may prefer separate over joined proceedings, which gives them more control over litigation strategy. For instance, they may argue particular points of evidence that relate to co-responsible states, who are not party to the proceedings. The ICJ in particular appears to attribute much importance to the views of the parties regarding the desirability of the joinder.
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One specific procedural issue related to multiple responsible states is the position of (ad 
C. The Position of Absent Parties
The third set of questions relates to how adjudication of claims against one or more responsible states is affected by the fact that one or more other (co-)responsible states are absent from the proceedings. Here in particular three aspects can be distinguished: the indispensable parties rule, intervention and questions of evidence.
The most important question is whether a court can proceed at all in the absence of particular co-responsible parties. The question may arise whether the procedural rules allow, or even require, the court to protect the interests of co-responsible parties who are not party to the dispute, by deciding that it has no jurisdiction over the claim against the actor over which it otherwise would have jurisdiction. The Monetary Gold principle, as it operates in the practice of the ICJ is the prime manifestation of this rule. 73 In the ICJ these concerns have not materialised in practice, however. Also in the WTO the right to intervention appears to be sufficiently broadly construed to allow (in the rare cases of shared responsibility in the WTO) co-responsible parties to intervene to defend their interests. 74 In the ECtHR, not only co-responsible states party to the Convention, but also international organisations, which cannot be a party to the proceedings, can intervene.
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A separate set of questions relates to evidence. 76 When some, but not all, responsible parties are involved in the proceedings, the question arises whether the court can make the necessary factual determinations. 77 The absence of co-responsible parties may adversely affect the interests of both plaintiff and respondents, 'both by its inability to obtain needed evidence and by the differential levels of obligation that could be created when some but not all of the involved States are bound by the Court's judgment'. 78 The question then is what powers are available to obtain evidence of co-responsible parties who are not a party to the dispute before the court or tribunal in question. 79 Has the court or tribunal in question a 'right to seek information', extending to actors who are not parties to the particular dispute, and how can this be relevant in situations of shared For this reason the principle of consent will be considered in the separate contributions.
However, obviously the principle of consent has a bearing on many other aspects of international adjudication, and thus cannot be considered to be distinctive for shared responsibility.
The same might hold for questions of evidence. Paparinskis notes: 'while cases of shared responsibility might illustrate the evidentiary challenges in particularly clear terms, the challenges are those of evidence in the ICJ (and international dispute settlement) more broadly and would have to be dealt with in terms of those debates.'
for that reason wish to intervene. Yet, no question of responsibility need to arise. This scenario raises questions (such as the scope of the right to intervene) that may be relevant to questions of shared responsibility, and as such they need to be studied. However, they are not specific or exclusive for situations of shared responsibility.
Third, some rules relate to multiple parties that are involved in responsibility, but that do not necessarily involve questions of shared responsibility. For instance, the Monetary Gold case before the ICJ involved multiple parties, 88 but did not involve a question of shared responsibility.
Yet, the principle that was laid down in that case is highly relevant for questions of shared responsibility, and is considered in all individual contributions to this special issue. 89 Similarly, in particular cases where multiple states are injured, multiple states may bring a case against one responsible state. Again, no question of shared responsibility need to arise, yet the principles that apply to such invocation may be relevant.
Fourth, there exists a category of rules that specifically apply to, and has relevance for, questions of shared responsibility. The prime example is the principle of joint and several liability, that allows an injured party to claim damages from each of the (co-)responsible states.
90
Another example is particular evidentiary rules that pertain to causal determinations in relation to multiple responsible states.
91 88 Monetary Gold (n 58). 89 Paparinskis (n 3) __; Baetens (n 4) __; Bartels (n 5) __; Plakokefalos (n 6) __; Den Heijer (n 7) __. 90 See Section 5 below.
91 See Section 5.
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It thus appears that the category of procedural rules that is relevant to shared responsibility in large part consist of rules that are not exclusively relevant to shared responsibility. That does not in any way diminish their relevance for shared responsibility, and thus the relevance of the inquiry of the present special issue. However, it does mean that reflections on the justifications of such rules, and the possibility or desirability of a change in such rules, cannot be limited to their effects on shared responsibility, but have to take into account the broader set of interests that are served by such rules, and the wider set of circumstances that is affected by them.
Accounting for Differences
The procedural rules of the five selected international courts, and the practice related to the application of such rules, have one major feature in common: for none of the courts, the procedural rules envisage in a relevant extent the possibility of co-responsible actors. Just as the principles of international responsibility developed by the ILC barely recognise the possibility of shared responsibility, the procedural rules of international courts have very little to say on the situation where there is not one responsible state, but multiple responsible states acting as defendants. Thus, the procedural rules that apply to litigation of shared responsibility are the ordinary procedural rules, that have to be adjusted to fit the specific characteristics of shared responsibility and, more generally, multilateral dispute settlement.
The need for such adjustment arises only sparsely. While the number of situations before international courts that can be characterised in terms of shared responsibility appears to increase, most of such situations are litigated as cases of individual responsibility, and no procedural questions of adjudication of shared responsibility arises. 33 To the extent that the need for adjustment to the specific contest of shared responsibility does arise, the picture that emerges is above all one of diversity. The procedural rules and their application in practice show substantial differences. Notable differences exist in the type of actors whose shared responsibility is engaged that can be brought before the court, in the role of consent as a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction over co-responsible states, in the scope of the applicable law as a manifestation of jurisdiction, in the requirements of standing, in the practice of joinder, and in the role of the indispensable parties rule, and in the powers of the courts to obtain evidence from actors that are not party to the proceedings.
From such differences it can be inferred that we cannot identify a body of general principles of procedural law that equally apply to all international courts. 92 Rather, the procedural rules are regime specific, each negotiated by the parties, and filled in by the judges, in the context of the specific normative and institutional context in which that court functions.
In the diverse spectrum, some courts are better able to handle questions of shared responsibility than others. In the ICJ, in particular the Monetary Gold principle and the rule and practice of joinder may complicate determinations on shared responsibility. In the ECtHR, both these rules are less problematic, but other problems exist here, notably the requirements of a jurisdictional link and the victim requirement.
The question then is what accounts for such differences. Perhaps the most important factor is that the degree in which a treaty regime protects particular public values influences the way that questions of shared responsibility will be adjudicated. In a horizontal, bilateral setting, The degree in which any particular set of procedural rules allows an international court to adjudicate claims of shared responsibility, thus necessarily requires a broader assessment of the nature and functions of international courts.
